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The Plutocratic Gap in the CPI: Evidence from Spain
MARIO IZQUIERDO, EDUARDO LEY, and JAVIER RUIZ-CASTILLO*
The plutocratic gap is defined as the difference between the inflation measured
according to the current official consumer price index (CPI) and a democratic
index in which all households receive the same weight. During 1992–97, the pluto-
cratic gap in Spain averaged 0.055 percentage points a year. Since positive and
negative gaps cancel out, however, the average absolute gap is significantly larger:
0.090 percentage points a year. For the purposes of accounting for the plutocratic
gap, a 53-dimensional commodity space can be conveniently reduced to two dimen-
sions: a luxury index and a necessities index. [JEL C43, D31, D63]
T
he review of the literature carried out by a U.S. Senate Commission headed by
Michael Boskin (Boskin and others, 1996) identified several problems regarding
the U.S. consumer price index (CPI) elaborated by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). The Boskin Commission focused on five sources of bias in the CPI
and estimated that, on average, during the last few decades, the U.S. CPI has been
overstating the inflation rate by 1.1 percentage points a year.1Despite the importance
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1This bias might seem small. When compounded over time, however, the implications for (i) the pub-
lic deficit created through an indexed budget, (ii) the wage-bargaining process and the determination of
the nominal interest rates in the private sector, and (iii) the measurement of the economic performance in
real terms are little short of catastrophic.of the Boskin Commission report,2 some critics—for example, Pollak (1998),
Deaton (1998), and Madrick (1997a and b)—point out some neglected topics and,
in particular, the scant attention paid to distributional issues. 
In the CPI context, the issues raised by the heterogeneity of the population are
usually identified by asking “Whose cost-of-living index?,” a question that is viewed
in Pollak (1998) as encompassing three issues: “How many cost-of-living indices?”;
“Beer or champagne?”; and “What type of group indices?” The first issue refers to
whether we should have different indices for different groups: rich and poor, elderly
and non-elderly, urban and rural, and so on. The second issue refers to the selection of
the appropriate set of items, qualities, and outlets that are to be reflected in the index. 
The third issue, which is the topic of this paper, originates with the nature of
the CPI as a group index (Pollak, 1980). Given the commodity space and a house-
hold budget survey representative of the reference population, we could use each
household’s budget shares as the fixed weights for the construction of household-
specific price indices. It has been known since Prais (1958) that the official CPI is
the weighted average of such individual price indices with weights proportional to
each household’s total expenditures. Because richer households have greater
weights than poor ones, Prais called the CPI a plutocratic price index. Is there a
better alternative to this particular construction?3
In this paper, we suggest that the so-called democratic index, in which all
households receive the same weight, is an approach worth pursuing. Thus, we
define the plutocratic gap as the difference between inflation measured according
to the current official CPI and according to a democratic index. One reason to pur-
sue such an approach is that it is always interesting to know who suffers the great-
est inflation—those households with the largest total expenditures or those at the
bottom of the distribution. In the former case, we would say that prices have
behaved in an anti-rich manner, and in the latter case, in an anti-poor manner. In the
former (latter) case, we should expect mean inflation weighted by total household
expenditures to be greater (smaller) than simple average inflation. Thus, the pluto-
cratic gap would be positive or negative according to whether prices have behaved
in an anti-rich or an anti-poor manner, respectively (Fry and Pashardes, 1986). 
While the importance of the plutocratic gap depends crucially on its mag-
nitude, it must be emphasized that the lack of access to lower-level price data
will likely result in an underestimation of the real gap.4 Our best estimate of the
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2As Diewert (1998, page 56) puts it, “with a total budget of $25,000, Boskin, Dulberger, Griliches,
Gordon and Jorgenson have probably written the most important measurement paper of the century in
terms of its impact: Every statistical agency in the world is reevaluating its price measurement techniques
as a direct result of their report and the widespread publicity it has received.”
3As pointed out by Pollak (1998), the first two matters are given a cursory treatment in footnote 2 and
on page 71 of Boskin and others (1996). The Boskin Commission never addresses the third problem
directly, although Pollak selects some passages of its report that appear to reflect an implicit judgment that
the CPI ought to be a plutocratic price index.
4Statistical agencies could compute household-specific price indices using prices taken at the maxi-
mum level of geographical disaggregation. In this case, analysts would be able to obtain the better estimates
of the plutocratic gap. Nonetheless, given the data-collection practices currently in place in most countries,
first-level indices can only be constructed on a plutocratic basis, so there is a portion of the real plutocratic
gap that can not be recovered. See Chapter 8, “Whose Index? Aggregating Across Households,” in Schultze
and Mackie (2002) for a review of the practical difficulties involved in the construction of a democratic
index in the United States.plutocratic gap in Spain during the 1990s is 0.055 percentage points a year.5
Averaging magnitudes of different signs also underestimates the real impor-
tance of this gap, however. The gap in specific years oscillates from a maximum
of 0.150 percentage points to a minimum of –0.080 percentage points. The
mean absolute gap is much larger, 0.090 percentage points. The gap depends
negatively on the magnitude of the inflation in that subperiod. Finally, on the
basis of total expenditures elasticities, a 53-dimensional commodity space can
be conveniently reduced to two dimensions, consisting of a luxury index and a
necessity index. The price behavior of these two types of good provides a con-
vincing explanation of the oscillations observed in the plutocratic gap. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section I presents the empirical
results on the plutocratic gap in Spain during the 1990s. Section II is devoted to
examining the robustness of those results with respect to the time period and the
use of weighted group indices with weights proportional to household size.
Section III summarizes and discusses the political implications of our results in an
indexed economy. Appendix I describes the construction of the modified
Laspeyres index, and Appendix II, the data sources. 
I. The Plutocratic Gap
In order to estimate the plutocratic gap (defined below), we need to construct a
series of household-specific Laspeyres price indices. For that purpose, we use the
following two pieces of publicly available information for Spain: the 1990–91
household-budget survey used to estimate the weights of the official CPI and a set
of price subindices at a certain level of spatial and commodity disaggregation.
Using this information, for each household h interviewed in a quarter τ during the
1990–91 period (τ = spring, summer, and autumn of 1990, and winter of 1991),
we construct a series of modified Laspeyres statistical price indices,
based on period 0 (winter of 1991), which takes as a reference the commodity vec-
tor qh
τ actually acquired during the interview quarter τ . (Appendix I describes the
notation and the construction of the aggregate CPI. Appendix II describes the data
sources and discusses issues regarding the definition of household expenditures.) 
The period winter 1991–January 1998 will be divided in the seven subperiods
shown in Table 1. For each household h, we define the inflation (or deflation)
caused by the evolution of prices in a given subperiod by
The distribution of individual inflation rates in each subperiod is denoted by
ππ t =( π 1
t,...,π H
t ). For the entire period, we have ΠΠ =( Π 1,...,Π H) where Π H=(lh
T –1)
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5This amounts to about one third of the classical substitution bias estimated for the United States by
the Boskin Commission.The aggregate inflation for the population as a whole according to the pluto-
cratic scheme is
where ψ h
t = ϕ hlh
t–1/(Σ hϕ hlh




t–1). Note that ψ h
t is proportional to ϕ hξ h
t. For the overall
period from 0 to T, since  lh
0 =1 ,the weights simplify to ϕ h and (1/H).
Consequently, we have
The plutocratic gap in the measurement of inflation in subperiod twill be defined
by Gt=PLUTt–DEMt and for the overall period by G=PLUT–DEM.6 Notice that,
as pointed out earlier, if price changes in subperiod t (or for the entire period) are rel-
atively more detrimental to the rich—that is, if π h
t (or Π h) are greater for rich house-
holds than for poor households—then we expect the plutocratic mean of individual
inflations to be greater than the democratic mean. In other words, Gtor Gwill be pos-
itive or negative, according to whether the price change in the corresponding time
interval is, respectively, anti-rich or anti-poor.
If we denote by Eit =(pit/pi0) the elementary price indices (defined in
Appendix I) and let xh represent household h’s total expenditures, so that x – denotes
average household total expenditures, then ζ =V ar(xh)/x – is a measure of the
inequality of household total expenditures. Further define β i =C o v ( xh,wh
i )/V ar(xh)
where wh
i denotes household h’s budget share for good i. Ley (2002) shows that the
plutocratic gap may be written as 
Gt = ζ NCov(β i,Eit). (1)
Note that β i is a rescaled covariance and therefore may be interpreted as a regres-
sion coefficient of the budget shares, wh
i, on total expenditures, xh. The plutocratic
gap is thus determined by the dispersion of total household expenditures, mea-
sured by ζ , and the sample covariance between β i and Eit. The sign of the pluto-
cratic gap is determined by the covariance term. A positive covariance term means
that the luxury goods relatively more favored by richer households experience
higher than average inflation and, as a consequence, necessities experience lower
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6Note that the inflation rate does not display temporal separability—that is, the inflation for a given
period does not equal the sum of inflations for a partition of that period. If the inflation rate were defined
instead as the log-price change, then temporal separability would hold but group separability would be lost.than average inflation. Similarly, a negative covariance implies that necessities
experience higher than average inflation while luxury goods experience lower than
average inflation. 
It should be emphasized that the size of the gap is an empirical matter and may
vary substantially at different places at different times. In particular, findings for one
country may have few implications for other countries with larger income inequal-
ity, more consumption heterogeneity, and different price dynamics (equation (1)).
The Main Findings
The first two columns of Table 1 show the plutocratic and the democratic means
of both ΠΠ and ππ t, while the third column shows the mean difference. (All figures
are expressed in percentage points per year.) Notice that the aggregate inflation
rate keeps decreasing over time, from a high of 6.9 percent during the first subpe-
riod to a low of 2.4 percent during 1997.
Three main findings are as follows. First, for the period as a whole, the esti-
mated plutocratic gap, G, is positive and equal to 0.055 percentage points a year.7
However, positive and negative gaps offset each other when averaged over the
whole period. The mean absolute gap is much larger, 0.090. These figures could
be compared with the overall upward bias for the Spanish economy, which—
following the Boskin Commission procedures—we have estimated at 0.61 per-
centage points a year (Ruiz-Castillo, Ley, and Izquierdo, 1999). 
Second, price behavior is not uniform over the entire period: Gt is negative
during 1994 and 1995, indicating that during these two years prices caused rela-
tively more damage to poorer households than to richer ones. 
Mario Izquierdo,Eduardo Ley,and Javier Ruiz-Castillo
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Table 1. The Plutocratic Gap During the 1990s
(percentage points per year)
Inflation
————————————
t Subperiods Plutocratic Democratic Plutocratic Gap
1W inter 1991 to 19921 6.989 6.911 0.078
2 1992 to January 1993  5.394 5.244 0.150
3 January 1993 to January 1994  5.271 5.165 0.105
4 January 1994 to January 1995  4.621 4.701 –0.080
5 January 1995 to January 1996  4.079 4.130 –0.050
6 January 1996 to January 1997  3.180 3.090 0.090
7 January 1997 to January 1998 2.494 2.369 0.125
Winter 1991 to January 1998    4.632 4.577 0.055
January 1993 to January 1998,
average absolute gap  0.090
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1Winter 1991 is the average of January, February, and March of 1991.
7This is approximately one-third of the substitution bias estimated by the Boskin Commission for the
U.S. economy, which is 0.15 percentage points a year.Third, at monthly frequencies, the gap is negatively, albeit weakly, associated
with the level of inflation. A regression of the monthly gap on monthly (pluto-
cratic) inflation results in a significant negative coefficient, –0.11, and an R –2 of 32
percent (Table 2).8 The higher the inflation, the lower the estimated gap, suggest-
ing that at higher inflation rates prices would tend to move more closely together. 
In the next subsection, we will show that the gap decreases as the inflation of
necessities increases. In addition, at monthly frequencies, inflation of necessities is
very volatile and drives most of the movements in general inflation. Consequently,
the regression of the gap on inflation produces this negative relationship.
An Economic Interpretation
Which goods are primarily consumed by the richer households? Ley (2002) shows
that we can relate the parameter β i in the expression of the plutocratic gap (equation
(1)) to a measure of the elasticity of the demand for good i to total expenditures, η i,
(2)
where w –
i is the average expenditure share for good i, the weights are given by
θ h=(xh – x –)2/(Σ h(xh – x –)2), and η h
i is the ratio of the percent deviation of house-
hold h’s consumption of good i with respect to its mean, divided by the percent







x =− ( ) ∑ 1,
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8Fourteen percentage points of the explained variance are due to the seasonal autoregressive term—
that is, the R –2 drops to 18 percent when the lag-12 autoregressive term is dropped.
Table 2. The Plutocratic Gap Versus Inflation
(dependent variable: monthly plutocratic gap Gt, in percentage points)
Sample (Adjusted)
—————————————————————————
1992:02–1998:01   1980:05–1991:12  1976:02–1981:03
Constant        0.035 0.072 0.124
(3.80) (5.95) (3.54)
Inflation       –0.109 –0.115 –0.073
(4.66) (–9.17) (–3.28)
Lag-12 autoregressive term   0.353 0.470
(3.10) (6.19)
R
–2 0.32 0.50 0.14
D-W 1.80 1.84 1.60
Ljung-Box Q(12) 3.63 14.64 13.19
Ljung-Box Q(24) 10.9 30.78 27.45
Number of observations  60 128 62
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The t-ratios are in parentheses.(3)
Thus, for each household h, η h
i can be interpreted as good i’s total-expenditure
elasticity. Moreover,for each good i,the overall-demand elasticity with respect to total
household expenditures can be estimated by η i=1+(x –/w –
i)β i. Whenever β i >0,it fol-
lows that η i >1.  If η i =1 ,then the plutocratic and democratic shares for good i are
identical and the price behavior of this good cannot contribute to the plutocratic gap. 
Although the Spanish statistical agency, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística,
collects prices for 471 goods, we have access to price data only at higher aggrega-
tion levels. For instance, we can access national price data for only 110 aggregate
goods, regional price data for 57 aggregate goods, or provincial price data for only
33 aggregate goods. Our calculations are based on 53 goods (21 food commodities
at a regional level and 32 nonfood commodities at the provincial level). The box-
plots in Figure 1 show the narrowing of the distribution of the η is toward 1 as a
result of aggregation (110 goods, 53 goods, and 19 goods). As noted before, if η i is
genuinely unity for a good at the lowest level of aggregation, it means that this par-
ticular good does not contribute to the plutocratic gap. However, when η i artificially
approaches unity owing to aggregation, then there is no chance for the researcher
to recover it, regardless of the underlying contribution to the plutocratic gap of the
goods included in this aggregate commodity. This lack of lower-level price data is
a serious shortcoming for researching the topics in this paper. Consequently, the
actual plutocratic gap could easily be substantially larger than our estimates.
The initial 53 goods are classified into four groups of goods according to their
total expenditure elasticity. Group I (necessities) includes 20 goods with an elas-
ticity considerably smaller than 1 (η i < 0.9); Group III (other) includes 5 goods
with an elasticity relatively close to 1 (0.9 < η i < 1.1); and Group IV (luxuries)
includes 20 goods that have an elasticity significantly greater than 1 (η i >1 . 1).
Group II is housing (η i =0 .9), which requires special treatment, since it accounts
for 20 percent of total household expenditures and expenditures on goods in
Group I move in opposite directions.9
The price indices of the goods in each group are then aggregated into four indices:
necessities, housing, other, and luxuries. In Table 3, for presentation purposes, the 53
goods are aggregated into 19 goods consistent with this classification. Table 3 shows
the budget shares for the quintiles of the distribution of total expenditures.
Intuitively, we understand how the evolution of prices affects richer households
compared with poorer ones depends upon whether luxury goods (43.86 percent of
total expenditures) or necessities (30.36 percent of total expenditures) experience
the greatest relative increase. For the entire period studied, the average inflation
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9As pointed out in Appendix II, the official CPI system based in 1992 includes only rental housing,
resulting in a total housing share of only 7.17 percent of total expenditures. In this paper, by contrast, the
housing share also includes the rental equivalent of owner-occupied housing and the rest of nonrental
housing, using available rent data from the rental housing sector to approximate rents for owner-occupied


















































































110 Goods 0.3 2.56
53 Goods 0.3 2.56
19 Goods 0.3 2.56
Expenditure Elasticities























































4 Table 3. Budget Shares in the Distribution of Total Household Expenditures and Total Elasticities for 19 Aggregate Goods
Budget Shares (in percent)
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Quintiles
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —   Elasticity Inflation1
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All η i π i
1F ood and non-alcoholic beverages2 33.28 27.74 24.08 20.31 14.59 19.95 0.65 2.43
2 Utilities and house maintenance 7.65 6.10 5.14 4.34 3.23 4.36 0.64 2.41
3T elephone and communication expenses 1.76 1.53 1.35 1.17 0.98 1.19 0.76 4.48
4 Therapeutic aides 0.31 0.29 0.25 0.26 0.21 0.24 0.83 2.64
5O ther food and alcoholic beverages3 5.23 5.40 5.25 4.87 3.98 4.62 0.87 3.45
Group I: Necessities (1+...+5) 48.23 41.06 36.07 30.95 22.99 30.36 0.68 2.67
6 Group II: Housing (6) 26.70 22.45 20.18 18.29 19.82 20.20 0.90 5.84
7T obacco 1.45 1.74 1.77 1.74 1.30 1.54 0.92 11.31
8 Durables 1.04 1.05 1.08 0.98 0.90 0.97 0.93 1.20
9 Other in Group III 2.99 3.31 3.44 3.43 3.11 3.25 0.99 3.40
Group III: (7+8+9) 5.48 6.11 6.29 6.15 5.31 5.76 0.96 5.49
10 Transportation services 0.86 0.91 1.04 1.17 1.21 1.12 1.15 5.73
11 Medical services and health insurance 1.16 1.31 1.36 1.57 1.77 1.57 1.20 5.25
12 Personal care goods and services 1.45 1.90 2.14 2.39 2.52 2.30 1.21 4.05
13 Clothing 4.64 6.19 7.36 8.15 8.57 7.79 1.23 2.76
14 Furniture, furnishings, and household items 1.17 1.62 2.03 2.26 2.69 2.28 1.34 3.67
15 Leisure, education, and culture 2.40 4.11 5.42 6.47 7.58 6.30 1.44 3.83
16 Restaurant, hotel, and tourist services 4.67 7.27 8.91 10.43 11.51 9.99 1.33 4.97
17 Domestic service 0.37 0.37 0.29 0.47 1.28 0.78 1.98 6.03
18 Transportation 2.87 6.70 8.91 11.70 14.74 11.54 1.55 4.87
19 Financial services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 2.42 5.42
Group IV: Luxuries (10+...+19) 19.59 30.38 37.46 44.60 51.87 43.68 1.37 4.33
Total household expenditure 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00 4.21
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1Average inflation rate 1992:02–1998:01, percent per year.
2Excludes beef, prepared seafood, and “other food products.”
3Includes beef, prepared seafood, and “other food products.”is only 2.59 percent a year. Housing experiences considerably greater inflation of
5.86 percent a year. 
The inflation rates for luxury goods (Group IV) and necessities (Group I) are
the main variables responsible for the positive sign of the plutocratic gap. Table 4
shows the results of regressing the monthly plutocratic gap Gt on the correspond-
ing monthly inflation rates of the three price subindices for Groups I, II, and IV.10
The coefficients have the expected signs and the results show that the inflation
rates of the luxury goods and necessities explain most of the behavior of the plu-
tocratic gap. Consequently, for the purpose of explaining the plutocratic gap dur-
ing the period studied (1992:01–1998:01), the commodity space of 53 goods could
be conveniently reduced to two aggregate goods that explain 92 percent of its vari-
ance. While the housing (Group II) coefficient is statistically significant, it con-
tributes only 2 percentage points of the 94 percentage points of the explained
variance when it is included in the regression (Table 4, column 2). 
II. Robustness
The Time Period
In this section, we study the robustness of our results on the G trend in two dif-
ferent directions. First, we consider the period covered by the two previous
Spanish CPI systems, which were used from August 1985 to December 1992
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10The constant term, as well as the index for Group III, are not statistically significant. Inspection of
the correlogram indicates existence of autocorrelation of order 12. After the inclusion of the lag-12 autore-
gressive term, there is no evidence of further serial correlation. The estimation is carried out using non-
linear least squares.
Table 4. Regression of Plutocratic Gap on Inflation Rates 
of Aggregate Subindexes




Group I: Necessities –0.073 –0.071
(–23.4) (–26.3)
Group II: Housing –0.024
(–4.5)
Group IV: Luxuries 0.081 0.098
(12.2) (14.3)





Ljung-Box Q(12) 13.00 15.45
Ljung-Box Q(24) 17.73 24.70
Number of observations 60 60
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Adjusted samples for 1993:02–1998:01. The t-ratios are in parentheses.(base year = 1983) and from January 1977 to July 1985 (base year = 1976). (See
the subsection on the “Data for 1970s and 1980s” in Appendix II for details.) The
main findings are the following.
(a) From winter 1981 to winter 1991, we estimate that G = 0.091 percentage points
a year, a positive gap larger than what we saw for the 1990s. During some sub-
periods, the gap is negative; and it oscillates from a maximum of 0.380 percent-
age points to a minimum, in absolute value, of 0.025 percentage points. 
(b) From 1973–74 to winter 1981, the plutocratic gap is always positive and reaches
very high annual maxima from 1976 to 1979, becoming equal to 0.833 percent-
age points in 1979. For the period as a whole, G= 0.264 percentage points a year,
a gap whose size is equal to the sum of the classical substitution bias and the out-
let bias according to the Boskin Commission.
(c) Spanish inflation during the second part of the 1970s and during the 1980s is con-
siderably greater than during the 1990s. (The mean annual inflation from the
midpoint of 1973 and 1974 to winter 1981 is 17.9 percent, and from winter 1981
to winter 1991 it is 8.5 percent.) As before, however, there is a negative relation-
ship between the size of the aggregate inflation in a given subperiod and the plu-
tocratic gap (Table 2).
Finally, to appreciate the variability of the plutocratic gap during the entire period
considered in this study, Figure 2 shows the evolution of the annual Gt, t=January
1977, . . ., January 1998, as well as of the annual inflation rate for the same period. 
The Aggregation Scheme
Second, it is interesting to experiment with other aggregation schemes to map a
distribution of household-specific inflations to an aggregate index. We therefore
examine the consequences of estimating the inflation for the population as a whole
as the weighted mean of individual inflations with weights proportional to house-
hold size (Nicholson, 1975).11
Table 5 presents mean total household expenditures at winter 1991 prices by
household size in the 1990–91 household survey, as well as the mean annual infla-
tion from the winter of 1991 to January of 1998 for that same partition. As in the
majority of other countries, there is a positive association between total expendi-
tures and household size. Therefore, weighting household inflation by household
size should have a similar effect, although of a lesser magnitude, than weighting
directly by total household expenditures as in the plutocratic scheme. Households
with two, four, or more members have a mean annual inflation below that of the
population as a whole, however, which works in the opposite direction. The net
result is that the new gap—defined as the difference between the plutocratic and
the household-size weighted mean—is equal to 0.088 percentage points a year.
Since this figure is greater than the previous estimate of 0.055 percentage points a
year for the plutocratic gap, it follows that, during this period, the second factor
has had a greater impact than the first.
Mario Izquierdo,Eduardo Ley,and Javier Ruiz-Castillo
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11Alternatively, one could define an aggregate price index that gives greater weight to poorer house-
holds. Given the results of this study, the corresponding gap in the measurement of inflation should be

















































































Figure 2. Spain: Interannual Plutocratic Gap and Inflation, 1977–98
Source: Authors’ calculations.The same computations for the 1980s and 1970s lead to estimates for the new
gap of 0.064 and 0.254 percentage points, respectively, versus estimates for the
plutocratic gap of 0.091 and 0.264 percentage points, respectively. The fact that
the new gap is smaller than the plutocratic gap indicates that the positive associa-
tion between total household expenditures and household size dominates the size
of the new gap during these two periods.
III. Concluding Remarks
In Spain, more than twenty-four thousand price movements are aggregated into a sin-
gle index.12 What are the distributional implications of such an aggregation scheme? 
We propose examining two elements. First, whether price behavior in a given
period hurts rich or poor households relatively more can be expressed in terms of
a single scalar: the plutocratic gap. The plutocratic gap is the difference between
inflation measured using the official CPI and inflation measured using an alterna-
tive group index in which all households are weighted equally. Second, we are
able to reduce the size of the price space to only two dimensions: a luxury good
and a necessity with considerably different total expenditure elasticities. Price
behavior at this level provides an intelligible explanation of the sign and magni-
tude of the plutocratic gap, accounting for 92 percent of its variance.13
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Table 5. Average Household Expenditures at Winter 1991 Prices 
and Average Annual Inflation in the Partition, by Household Size
Frequency Average Average  Annual
Household Size Distribution  Expenditures Inflation
(number of persons)( percent) (pesetas) (percent)1
1 9.99 1,147,338 4.842
2 22.30 1,795,808 4.625
3 20.77 2,559,993 4.634
4 24.97 3,091,959 4.611
5 13.22 3,277,244 4.623
6 5.44 3,516,374 4.627
7 or more 3.31 3,629,602 4.619
All 100.00 2,563,502 4.632
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1Winter 1991–January 1998.
12A commodity basket of 471 goods is priced in each of the 52 provinces in order to construct the set
of 24,492 elementary price indices that form the core of the current 1992 CPI system. A few goods are
priced at the national level, however, slightly reducing this number.
13As we show in Ruiz-Castillo, Ley, and Izquierdo (2002a), the gap between the change in money
income inequality and the socially relevant change in real income inequality is given by a term that cap-
tures the distributional role of price changes. The sign of this term is largely determined by the sign of the
plutocratic gap. In consonance with the results of the present study, using the mean logarithmic deviation
and a value of 0.5 for the parameter that reflects the economies of scale within the household, in Ruiz-
Castillo, Ley, and Izquierdo (2002a) we find that this term is positive. Thus, we conclude that the
decreases in real household expenditure inequality in Spain during the second part of the 1970s and the
1980s and 1990s have, respectively, been 9.07, 4.82, and 2.97 percent larger than the decrease in nominal
household expenditure inequality owing to the distributive role of price changes during these periods.In most countries, income taxes, public pensions, other public transfers, and
minimum wages are revised in terms of a plutocratic CPI. Why should a dollar
logic rather than a household or personal logic be followed in this matter?14 The
answer may lie in the widespread belief that the CPI represents an “average con-
sumer.” The consumer whose expenditure pattern is represented by the CPI, how-
ever, turns out to be less than fully representative. For the United Kingdom,
Muellbauer (1976) found this “average consumer”—whose budget shares corre-
spond to the official CPI—in the seventy-first percentile in the household expen-
diture distribution. For the United States in 1990, Deaton (1998) estimates that this
consumer occupies the seventy-fifth percentile; for Spain during the 1990s, we
find the CPI-represented consumer in the sixty-first percentile of the mean-
adjusted household expenditure distribution. 
Indexing by the current CPI has the following perverse effects that have not
been sufficiently emphasized before. When prices behave in an anti-poor way—
that is, when the plutocratic gap is negative—then spending on public programs,
which primarily benefit the poor, is revised below what it would have been if a
democratic group index had been used. (The reverse is true when prices behave
in an anti-rich way.) Similarly, if the plutocratic gap is negative, then direct tax
revenues would be larger than they would have been if a democratic group index
had been used.
From this point of view, the current plutocratic formula can be conceptually
criticized. Admittedly, this matter would be more important, the greater the size of
the plutocratic gap (and, perhaps, depending on the sign of the gap). For Spain, we
have shown that this gap (i) has had a positive sign over an extended period, (ii)
presents a rather unstable pattern over the short run, and (iii) has been large dur-
ing certain periods. There is relatively little information on this issue for other
countries,15 particularly in developing countries where changes in the relative
prices of a few staples may cause havoc in the standard of living of the majority
of the population. It may be advisable for their governments to estimate the plu-
tocratic gap on a regular basis. 
Statistical agencies could compute and make available, at least annually, sets 
of household-specific price indices. Given the set of (official) individual price
indices, anyone could study the differential inflation suffered by various subgroups
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14For a discussion of this issue, see Triplett (1983), Fry and Pashardes (1986), Griliches (1995), and
Pollak (1998); and, in connection to the poverty line, see National Research Council (1995).
15For the United Kingdom, Carruthers, Sellwood, and Ward (1980) indicate that from January 1975
to January 1979 the democratic index has increased by around 0.1 percentage points a year faster than the
official CPI. Fry and Pashardes (1986) also find that from 1974 to 1982 the plutocratic gap was negative.
For 1975–76, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) report that the inflation rate for the poor was around two per-
centage points higher than for the rich. Crawford (1996) finds, however, that between 1979 and the end
of 1992, inflation for richer households was 0.16 percentage points higher than the average for all house-
holds. Newberry (1995) finds that the distributional effects were negligible and not significantly different
from zero in Hungary and the United Kingdom during the 1980s. For the United States, Kokoski (2000)
finds that from 1972 to 1980 the democratic and the plutocratic Laspeyres indices are rather close in value
for most demographic groups, but, in general, the former exceeds the latter by 1 to 3 index points. Slesnick
(1991) finds that cost of living indices are surprisingly insensitive to the choice of the form of the index.
Garner, Ruiz-Castillo, and Sastre (1999) find evidence that the plutocratic gap during the 1980s indicates
that prices behaved in a slightly anti-rich way. See Ley (2002) for a summary of studies.of the population—something that needs to be considered before attempting to
formulate a political solution to the issue of “How many cost of living indices?”
Similarly, anyone would be in a position to estimate the difference in the mea-
surement of inflation created by the use of the current plutocratic CPI, as
opposed to other, politically interesting alternative group price indices. Note that
reporting household-specific price indices goes beyond the simple reweighting
of the CPI with group-specific weights as practiced by some statistical offices,
since price information from the relevant geographical area for each household
should be used—there is empirical evidence that geography is an important
determinant of price variation.16 Moreover, anybody could evaluate the distribu-
tional consequences of the methodological decisions of statistical offices. Take,
for example, the Boskin Commission’s analysis of the quality issue and the
introduction of new products—surely the most debated and criticized part of
their report. Various social critics—Madrick (1997a and b) and Deaton (1998),
for instance—conjecture that new goods and goods affected by quality effects
are disproportionately consumed by the rich. The impact of quality correction on
household inflation could be investigated if household price indices were avail-
able from the statistical office.17
Finally, Muellbauer (1976) indicates that he does not regard the historical
bias of inflation as the most important issue. Given that keeping down inflation
is such an important policy goal, it is natural that any government should be very
sensitive to the effects of policy change on the official CPI. Thus, the aggregate
weights are the forces that drive government policies affecting relative prices
and attempting to shift them in particular directions. Within this context, a set of
publicly available household-specific price indices would allow both the gov-
ernment and others to evaluate, both ex ante and ex post, the distributional con-
sequences of different policies. 
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16Cechetti, Mark, and Sonora (2000) study the dynamics of price indices for major U.S. cities using
panel econometric methods and find that relative price levels in different cities revert to the mean at an
exceptionally slow rate. The surprisingly slow rate of convergence can be explained by a combination of
the presence of transportation costs, differential speeds of adjustment to small and large shocks, and the
inclusion of nontraded goods prices in the overall price index. Alberola and Márques (1999) present sim-
ilar evidence for Spain.
17In our context, this implies that the set of household-specific price indices after the correction of
this bias should exhibit a smaller plutocratic gap. Are these critics correct? In Ruiz-Castillo, Ley, and
Izquierdo (2002a), we have tested this idea by combining the structure of the bias for the U.S. economy
with the consumer behavior of Spanish households as revealed in the 1990–91, 1980–81, and 1973–74
household surveys. The plutocratic gaps after the correction of the quality bias in the intervals (winter
1991 to January 1998, winter 1981 to winter 1991, and 1973–74 to winter 1981) are 0.035, 0.073, and
0.249 percentage points a year, respectively. Since, as we have seen, the plutocratic gaps before the cor-
rection are 0.055, 0.091, and 0.264 percentage points a year, respectively, we can conclude that there is
some evidence indicating that the point made by those social critics is well taken.APPENDIXES
I. The Modified Laspeyres Price Index
First, a word on notation. Subscripts will be used for goods, i = 1,...,N, and time, t = 1,...,T,
while superscripts will be used for households, h = 1,...,H. Boldface symbols denote vectors.









is. Household h’s budget shares will be denoted by wh
i and its total household
expenditures by xh. Finally, uppercase symbols will be used for aggregation over house-
holds—for example, X =Σ hxh—while a bar over a symbol will denote an average quantity—
for example, x – = X/H.
To  understand the relation between a CPI and an aggregate Laspeyres statistical price
index (SPI), we have to start by recognizing that statistical agencies partition the country’s
physical space into a set of J geographical areas, which we index by j = 1,...,J. For every item
i in every area j, during each period t (typically a month), statistical agencies collect price
quotes for a number of previously determined item specifications in a certain predetermined
sample of outlets. (This is where Pollak places the “beer or champagne” issue.) These price
quotes are aggregated in elementary price indices Eijt. (This is where the Boskin Commission
places the “lower substitution level” problem. Neither this problem nor the “beer or cham-
pagne” issue should concern us in this study.) 
Conceptually, we can view an elementary price index as the relative price of item i in area
j in period t with respect to the base period 0—that is,
Household budget surveys provide information, however, not on individual prices and quantities,
which are often hard to define, but on individual expenditures in each good, xh
iτ ; total household
expenditures, xh
τ =Σ hxh
iτ ; and budget shares, wh
iτ = xh
iτ /xh
τ . For each area j, we observe the aggre-
gate expenditures on each good, Xijτ =Σ h∈ jxh
iτ ,and aggregate budget shares, Wijτ =Xijτ /Xτ ,w here
Xτ =Σ hxh
τ is the aggregate total expenditure for the entire population. Under the assumption that
all households living in the same area face the same prices, we can view observable household
expenditures on item i by a household h living in area j and that is interviewed in period τ as the
product of (generally unobserved) prices pijτ and (unobserved) quantities qh
iτ —that is,
xh
iτ = pijτ qh
iτ . Denote the vector of aggregate quantities actually purchased during the survey
period τ by Qτ =( Q1τ ,...,QNτ ) where Qiτ =Σ jQijτ and Qijτ =Σ h∈ jqh
iτ . Then we have 
If we define the plutocratic weights ϕ h
τ = xh
τ /Xτ , then
If we have information on what we call the adjustment factors for each i, Aijτ =(pijτ /pij0),then
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vector qh
τ , is defined as
where pjt =(p1jt,...,pNjt).
At the aggregate level, let pt =(p1t,...,pNt), where pit =Σ j(Qijτ /Qiτ )pijτ . Then the aggregate
Laspeyres SPI that takes as a reference the vector Qτ is given by
For each good i in an area j, let Wij = pij0Qijτ /(p0 ⋅ Qτ ). The CPI based on period 0 is an
aggregate SPI defined by
which is what the Bureau of Labor Statistics calls a modified Laspeyres aggregate price index
(Moulton, 1996), with base year 0 and reference consumption patterns surveyed at τ .
Finally, for each household h in an area j,w e now redefine the plutocratic weights as
φ h =( pj0⋅ qh
τ )/(p0⋅ Qτ ) and the budget shares as ω h
i =(pij0qh
iτ )/(pj0⋅ qh
τ ). Then, as before, aggre-
gate expenditure shares can be expressed as a plutocratic-weighted mean of individual expen-
diture shares:
and
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152II. The Data
Data for 1990s
The EPF (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares) collected by the Spanish statistical agency,
INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística), from April 1990 to March 1991 is a household budget
survey of 21,155 household sample points representing a population of approximately 11 mil-
lion households and 38 million persons occupying residential housing in all of Spain, includ-
ing the North African cities of Ceuta and Melilla.
The INE collects elementary price indices (denoted by Eijt in Appendix I) for a commod-
ity basket consisting of 471 items in each of the country’s 52 provinces under the present CPI
system, based in 1992. For confidentiality reasons, the INE does not publish this information
at the maximum disaggregation level. Instead, it publishes on a monthly basis price subindices
for January 1993 to January 1998 for a commodity breakdown of 110 subclases, 57 rúbricas,
33 subgrupos, and 8 grupos at the national level; the rúbricas, subgrupos,a n d   grupos at the 18
Autonomous Community level;18 and the subgrupos and grupos at the 52-province level.
For any commodity breakdown, it is possible to reconstruct the official CPI series using
an appropriately defined aggregate-budget-shares vector. Similarly, defining a budget-shares
vector for every household in the 1990–91 sample, we can obtain a series of household-
specific CPIs for any commodity breakdown. In principle, the only difference between alter-
native specifications of the commodity space is that the dispersion of the set of individual CPIs
should be greater, the greater the disaggregation level of the price information used in their
construction. Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that we used the same informational basis as
the INE—namely, the 1990–91 EPF—we found several small discrepancies between our esti-
mates of the aggregate-budget-shares vectors and those published by the INE—for the details,
see Ruiz-Castillo, Ley, and Izquierdo (1999). Thus, the CPI series that we can reconstruct vary
slightly, depending on the different commodity breakdowns characterizing the price informa-
tion we use. Ruiz-Castillo, Ley, and Izquierdo (1999) find that the specification consisting of
the 21 food rúbricas at the Autonomous Community level and the 32 nonfood subgrupos at
the provincial level outperforms the rest of the alternatives according to various statistical and
economic criteria.
It should be emphasized that our series of household-specific price indices defined over this
53-commodity space differs from the series underlying the official CPI in two ways. First, there
are several practices incorporated in the official definition of total household expenditures for
which we believe there are superior alternatives. We specifically refer to (i) the definition of hous-
ing expenditures for households occupying nonrental housing; (ii) the inclusion of imputations for
home production, wages in kind, and subsidized meals; and (iii) the estimation of annual food and
drink expenditures using all the available information on bulk purchases in the 1990–91 EPF. The
joint impact of these modifications is important: because of them, the official CPI understates true
Spanish inflation from 1992 to January of 1998 by 0.241 percentage points a year.
Second, it should be noted that the Spanish CPI is not the modified Laspeyres price index
that takes as a reference the mean quantity vector actually acquired by the EPF households when
they were interviewed in the 1990–91 survey period. The reason is that the INE does not use the
adjustment factors Aijτ defined in Appendix I (Ruiz-Castillo, Ley, and Izquierdo, 2002b).
Fortunately, Lorenzo (1998) provides such factors for the 110 subclases at the national level.
Using this information, for each household h interviewed in a quarter τ during the 1990–91 period
(τ =s pring, summer, and autumn of 1990, and winter of 1991), we construct a series of modified
Laspeyres SPIs, l(pt,p0;qh
τ ) based on period 0 = winter of 1991, that take as a reference the com-
modity vector qh
τ actually acquired during the interview quarter τ . If we normalize this series at




τ )=( pt⋅ qh
τ )/(p0⋅ qh
τ ).
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18The 52 Spanish provinces are grouped in 18 Autonomous Communities.Data for 1970s and 1980s
The EPFs that serve to estimate the official weights were conducted from April 1980 to March
1981 and from July 1973 to June 1974. These are household budget surveys strictly compara-
ble to the 1990–91 EPF, containing 23,972 and 24,151 household sample units, respectively,
that approximately represent a population of 9–10 million households and 34–37 million per-
sons in 1980–81 and 1973–74, respectively. In this case, we do not depart from the official def-
inition of household total expenditures, but, as before, we must take into account the fact that
the Spanish CPI is not a modified Laspeyres price index. 
We construct two series of appropriate household-specific price indices with the informa-
tion provided by (i) the 1980–81 and 1973–74 EPFs; (ii) the official monthly price information
for 106 and 88 subclases at the national level using the 1983 and 1976 bases, respectively; and
(iii) a series of adjustment factors for 52 goods that constitute the minimum common denomi-
nator between the 58 official rúbricas and the 60 goods provided by Catasús and others (1986)
for the first period and for the 5 goods at the national level provided by García España and
Serrano (1980) for the second period. 
Further details can be found in Ruiz-Castillo and others (1999) and Ruiz-Castillo, Ley, and
Izquierdo (1999). All the datasets used in this paper, including the series of modified Laspeyres
price indices, are available at http://www.eco.uc3m.es/investigacion/epf.html.
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